This bipartite paper flows out of the writing of a history of criminal justice and it attempts to
Introduction
. . . what seems easy to discard now is often not regarded that way later on. If we keep collections to a "reasonable" size by getting rid of things not worth saving now, we will inevitably make what later generations will see as terrible mistakes. Some of what we discard now will be just what they prize, need or want. 1 In April 2009, David Downes, Tim Newburn and I were the last scholars to be appointed official historians by the then prime minister, Gordon Brown, and our theme was to be the history of criminal justice between 1959 and 1997. The prospectus drafted by the Cabinet Office opened by stating that 'The Official History would examine the significant changes in the Criminal Justice System over the last 40 years . . . It would chart the position before, during and after our [sic] changes to the system', and, it continued, 'An appropriate starting point would probably be the Beeching Report, the abolition of the Assizes and the introduction of the single Crown Court in 1971'. I submitted the first two volumes on the liberalising legislation of the 1960s and the founding of the crown court and the Crown Prosecution Service to the Cabinet Office in May 2016. Others will follow. Our principal sources were interviews; published articles, reports and books; private papers; and documents in The National Archives, local archives and university collections. Given their criticality, one of our first tasks was to ascertain what files had been retained and what had been thrown away, especially by The National Archives, the prime repository of files touching on criminal justice policy-making. We soon established that much had indeed been thrown away, and we sought to explore how it came about that record-keeping in the major archive in England and Wales in the latter half of the twentieth century had been organised as much by a desire to destroy papers as to preserve them. The quest came to offer an interesting small exercise in the sociology of knowledge, examining how the past can be made perceptible or imperceptible, and representing perhaps the first such extended analysis of a pivotal series of events.
What a later deputy keeper of the records, the effective manager of the Public Record Office, called the 'two greatest desiderata -centralized control and centralized housing', 11 were achieved by entrusting a 'pragmatic Benthamite', Lord Langdale, 12 the master of the rolls, the second most senior judge in England and Wales, responsible (as his title suggested) for the records or 'rolls' of the chancery court, to 'keep safely the public records' -defined somewhat elastically -in one place, a single institution and a new building, in a professionally staffed 13 Public Record Office (PRO), that was opened formally in Chancery Lane in 1856.
14 In 1854, that embryonic Office's collection was amalgamated with that of the State Paper Office, 15 but the consigning of documents and the regulations for their safekeeping or destruction by government departments remained somewhat haphazard until the Public Record Office Acts of 1877 16 and 1898, 17 and there still remained no formal duty on departments to transfer their papers to the new Office or make them accessible to the public 18 (the Home Office, for example, did not routinely forward its papers until 1880).
Particularly important was Section 1 of the 1877 Act, under which the master of the rolls was empowered to order the destruction of what were called 'documents of not sufficient public value to justify their preservation in the Public Record Office', providing not only that the destruction schedules did not include documents 'which can reasonably be considered of legal, genealogical or antiquarian use or interest, or which give any information not to be found elsewhere', but also that the schedules themselves had been agreed jointly by the head of the department and the master of the rolls and laid before Parliament for four weeks.
The records may have become better tended and organised 19 but the space that was allotted to house them was insufficient from the first. 'In effect', reported Aidan Lawes, an assistant keeper, in the PRO's own autobiography, 'the Office was acting as an agency for other departments', 20 and the departments of an increasingly active state were generating more and more paper. In 1853 alone, it was estimated that some 7,000,000 documents had piled up in government offices, 21 and much of that paper 11 The deputy keeper of records; 'Preservation and housing of public records' in The Times, 24 May 1951. 12 Lord Langdale, 1783-1851, was master of the rolls between 1836 and 1851. A friend of Jeremy Bentham, and a liberal, he has been described as the 'father of record reform'. His biographer, G.F.R. Barker, continued, 'His perseverance led the government to consent to provide an adequate repository for the national records' (ODNB). It was he who agitated for the transfer to one, purpose-built and professionally-staffed, new depository, 'the strong box of the Empire', the records that were then scattered in and around London: see J. Cantwell, The Public Record Office: 1838-1958, (1991) . Elsewhere, Cantwell argues that Lord Langdale was more than a little reluctant to take charge of the reforms stemming from the 1838 Act ('The 1838 Public Record Office Act and its aftermath: A new perspective' in Journal of the Society of Archivists, vii (5), pp. 278, 280). 13 Levine, 'History in the archives' pp. 20-41. 14 The building was constructed on a site that had been in the possession of the master of the rolls and used to store the rolls since 1377. (See an undated booklet published by King's College -Chancery Lane Library & Information Services Centre -which had acquired the building from the Rolls Estate in 1998). 15 The State Paper Office was founded in 1578 to house the papers of the the then deputy keeper of the records, and, in practical effect, the working head of the Public Record Office, called in 1949 a continuing and 'enormous increase in accruals of modern Archives'. 26 To be sure, a succession of improvised remedies had been attempted over the years to manage the backlog-one being the establishment in 1943 by the master of the rolls of a committee which recommended a three-stage life cycle for records -'current, semi-current and selection for permanent preservation', and the recourse, under what Sir Hilary called the 'Limbo' plan, f loated in March 1944 but implemented later, first to storing tens of thousands of feet of semi-current departmental papers awaiting disposal in 'deep shelters' at London Underground stations at Goodge Street, Belsize Park, Clapham Common, Clapham North and Camden Town, and then to the requisition of a former ordnance factory at Yeading, 27 and the conversion of buildings into a 'branch' repository at Ashridge, with an extra 10 miles of shelving, and a 'limb' repository in Hayes in the early 1950s. 28 There was to be the assignment in 1949 of John Collingridge, who had joined the Public Record Office as an assistant keeper in 1926, to the new post of liaison officer charged with 'establishing and maintaining closer relations with depositing Departments and studying the special problems incidental to their Records'. 29 But it was never enough. Government had not fully planned for the sheer extent of the problem that was thought to have arisen by mid-century. 22 'The Public Records' in The Times, 27 Dec. 1872. 23 Roger Ellis, lecturer in archive administration at University College, London, and formerly principal assistant keeper, reported that a number of departments 'unable to keep up, accumulated a bulk of dormant Records so daunting that less and less effort was made to deal with them' ('The "limbo" plan for departmental records' in OandM Bulletin, vii (1), Feb. 1952, p. 13). 24 Under the heading 'Elimination of records of ephemeral value accumulating in modern departments', Sir Hilary Jenkinson reported that 'Work in this Section as a result of War-time accumulations continues to be heavy'. 109th report of the deputy keeper of the records (1949 for 1947), p. 5. See also H. Jenkinson, 'British Archives and the War' in The American Archivist, vii (1), Jan. 1944 ) pp. 1-17. 25 Sir Hilary Jenkinson, 1882-1961, took a degree in classics at Cambridge and then entered the PRO in 1906, becoming deputy keeper from 1938 until his retirement in1954. His entry in the ODNB says that 'In the course of his lifetime Jenkinson played a leading part in establishing in England principles which should govern the care of records, in rousing public interest in their preservation, and in providing for the professional training of their custodians, who should be, as he preferred to call them, archivists rather than amateurs with antiquarian tastes. His gift for personal relationships undoubtedly went far to promote the cause he had at heart, although his pursuit of perfection betrayed him into a doctrinaire advocacy of ideas and practices which created difficulties and brought frustration'. 26 111th report of the deputy keeper of the records (1950 for 1949), p. 3. 27 See for example, the 109th report of the deputy keeper of the records, p. 5. 28 It was not until the end of 1969 to that permission had finally to be given to start constructing an entirely new and much larger repository for the PRO at Kew, the present site of what is now the National Archives or TNA. The new building was opened in 1977 with 75 miles of shelving ('Public Record Office starts to move house on Monday' in The Times, 12 May 1977). By 2014, it had come to house some 11 million items on190 kilometres -or 118 miles -of shelving (and, it was then estimated, an extra 2 km or just under 1¼ miles of space were still required every year). 29 111th report of the deputy keeper of the records, p. 3. His posting was thought to be something of an unwelcome deformation of the core duties of the PRO: the deputy keeper of the records reported that, although it 'was almost unavoidable . . . [it] seems likely at no distant date to alter considerably the balance of work in the Department . . . ' In 1957, Lord Evershed, the master of the rolls, described to the House of Lords the way in which the law and practice of record management supposedly functioned. It rested on a system that had been devised a century before for legal records in a simpler world, a more rudimentary government and much, much less paper:
whatever was in the mind of my predecessor, Lord Langdale, in 1845, when he made with the then Home Secretary, Lord John Russell, the somewhat casual and typically English arrangement upon which the management of departmental records has since depended, that arrangement did not provide -and, indeed, as I understand it, was quite incapable of providing -any real solution in modern circumstances to the problem of selection. Indeed, I think it may even be said that the arrangement negatived the possibility of such a solution. On the one hand, it provided, according to Lord Langdale's letters, that the Public Record Office should be but the agent of the Government Departments in preserving the records and receiving them from the Departments. On the other hand, in the light especially of slightly later legislation, it absolutely prevented the Departments from acting as their own destroyers or selectors of documents. 30 'If intended to be a temporary convenience' he had earlier explained, the arrangement so negotiated 'has, in fact, lasted ever since. . . . no single document coming into existence in any Department of State can be destroyed save after a procedure requiring the personal co-operation of the master of the rolls; and in theory (it is said) the master of the rolls could secure the removal of any papers from the desk of any Minister to the Public Record Office'. 31 That was the formal position, but informally, and under growing strain, a proliferation of ad hoc, home-grown and often unsanctioned practices appear to have mushroomed across the Whitehall departments.
Many disposal procedures were actually quite unorganised. John Collingridge recounted how in a number of departments 'weeding' could be little more than 'an occasional operation, executed by staff temporarily diverted from the normal work of the department'. 32 It worked only where documents were capable of being listed; the 'schedules so compiled and approved were in fact generally brief and the terms necessarily wide and often vague'; 33 'No possibility exist[ed] of examination of the individual documents', 34 and, to cap it all, departments were given 'a continuing authority to get rid of worthless papers throughout the whole range of their records'. 35 Moreover, until a comparatively late date, those who received the documents, the assistant keepers at the Public Record Office, were not formally trained in archival practice. 36 They regarded themselves, said Hans Rasmussen, the coordinator of special collections technical at Louisiana State University and an historian of the archivists' profession of the period, primarily as civil servants rather than as archivists.
It was only when a committee under the chairmanship of Sir James Grigg, a former secretary of state for war, 38 a man described by Edward Playfair, the Treasury official who nominated him, as 'bubbling over with mental energy and at the top of his form', 39 was appointed in 1952 to review the existing arrangements that systematic reform may be said to have begun on any scale. 40 The committee was the government's answer to what John Collingridge called 'the very alarming state of affairs revealed by the information produced by Departments in response to a questionnaire sent out by an organisation and methods team of the Treasury in 1951'. 41 The Treasury was the department of state officially responsible for the PRO. It provided its premises for the work of the committee, and, through its minister, the chancellor of the exchequer, was accountable for its doings to Parliament. It was also the regulatory department within Whitehall where organisation and methods analysis was being developed with some gusto; 42 and it had come to conclude that at a time of harsh financial cuts that were falling especially heavily on the PRO, 43 'a radical change might be required in present practice in order to ensure only documents worthy of permanent retention were passed to the Public Record Office, and to ensure that the problem of providing permanent storage space did not grow out of hand'. 44 The organisation and methods team had been prompted to investigate existing procedures not only by the 38 Sir Hilary Jenkinson did think, and he rejected most of the assumptions, procedures and findings which the team had mobilised to confront the problem. He may have agitated for change -indeed, Cantwell called him a 'thorn in the Treasury's f lesh' 52 -but he did not accept the Treasury's diagnosis. Difficulties resided not in the PRO, he said, but elsewhere, in the record-management procedures practised by government departments across Whitehall. The remedy for such an unrestrained increase in records lay at the registry stage, 'the point at which Documents began to accumulate', because 'vast quantities of papers are made and distributed unnecessarily'; 'working, routine and formal papers are filed and put away equally without thought'; and systems of filing seemed to be devised 'specially to make any separation of sheep and goats laborious and difficult'. 'All these troubles could', he concluded, 'be mitigated if not eliminated by intelligent organisation in registry'. 53 In short, the Treasury's response was ill-judged and unwelcome. It did not know what it was talking about. The fault did not lie with the PRO, and its archivists should not be treated as rude mechanicals whose actions could be subjected to the unpolished methods of time and motion study: 45 Hoover commission on the organization of the executive branch of the government, Report, (New York, 1949). The commission reported on pp. 78 and 80 that 'the maintenance of records costs the Federal Government enormous sums annually. The records now in existence would fill approximately six buildings each the size of the Pentagon. In 1948, some 18 million square feet of space were filled with records. Our task force estimates that, on the basis of rental value alone, the space costs for this volume of records is at least 20 million dollars annually'. And the number of records was increasing alarmingly, from 5m cubic feet in 1933, to 10m in 1938 and over 15m in 1944. Its recommendation was that there should be a new record management bureau in the Office of General Services; a new federal record management law to provide for the more effective preservation, management, and disposal of government records; and an 'adequate record management program in each department and agency' (p. 80). 46 TNA, T 222/538, Indecipherable, note to Mr Simpson, 29 Nov. 1951. 47 The Treasury organisation and methods division had taken an avid interest in what was called 'this very general and rather devastating examination of the executive machine as a whole' (Anon, 'Reorganisation of U.S. government departments: Report of the Hoover Commission' in OandM Bulletin, iv (2), Apr. 1949, p. 19). It was to publish three different synopses of aspects of the commission's work, although it did not touch on record management -itself a very small part of the report. 48 Sir William Hancock (1898-1988), occupied the Chichele chair of economic history at the University of Oxford between 1944 and 1949. In 1957, he returned to his native Australia to teach at Canberra. 49 'Time', he said, 'does his weeding through the agency of officials working by rules . . .' Insufficiently valuable documents were to be destroyed, but 'Unfortunately, the criteria of value are variable and subjective'. And the task had grown to such proportions that 'I doubt whether the old procedures of the Public Record Office can cope with it. . . . Some of the most precious grain of war-historical record never got into the registered files and may therefore never come to the Public Record Office: conversely, in the registered files of the war period there are tares by the million; but good wheat is mingled with the tares. How can they be separated?' The History of our times, Those who blocked reform must, it was surmised, have done so because of their reluctance for personal reasons to accept a disturbance to the status quo; the difficulty of being hoisted out of 'the grooves into which they have become well moulded'; their lack of information about what was proposed; or their selfishness, old age or lack of confidence. Any non-cooperation had to be overcome in the name of what was 'logical and desirable'.
56
The 69-year old Sir Hilary, moulded in the grooves of the PRO for some 45 years, wedded to an older way of working, had little prospect of securing sympathy or support. Like poor William Huskisson, he stood in the way of a new and very different set of grooves, the ringing grooves of change. It was a foretaste of the quarrel between Whigs and Tories, modernisers and conservatives, that would resound across the face of public administration in general, and the criminal justice system in particular, throughout the latter half of the century, and the outcome was almost always the same. The progress of rational reform could not be brooked. Sir Edward Bridges, the permanent secretary at the Treasury, was certainly not to be brooked. His reply to Sir Hilary was unyielding: 'It seems to me that we should now consider whether there should be an enquiry into the fundamentals of the Public Record system and, if so, what form it should take'. 57 Besides, there was a new and powerful political impetus driving change. Sir Edward recorded that the idea of setting up an enquiry had received strong endorsement 54 This led the Prime Minister to suggest that we ought to devote more attention to destroying old papers so as to avoid the demand for a lot of new filing equipment. I was happy to be able to tell the Prime Minister that we had in mind the appointment of a Committee to consider this business of records. It is clear that the Prime Minister would like this dealt with as a matter of urgency and at a rather high level.
59
And it was in that very particular context that the next steps were taken 60 and defended, 61 being propelled by what the chancellor of the exchequer, R.A. Butler, described as 'a side wind before the Cabinet'. 62 Ministers were, he said, 'discussing troubles of accommodation and the accumulation of papers was mentioned as being one of the difficulties. The Cabinet invited me to arrange for the appointment of a Committee . . .'
63
Preliminary discussions about the scope of the Grigg committee's work focused solely on the economic and logistical difficulties posed by the huge number of documents threatening to engulf government departments and the PRO. The Treasury's director of organisation and methods was told in December 1951: more than a quarter million linear feet of shelving could be cleared if weeding were brought up to date . . . One of the main points to be considered in the enquiry now proposed is how Departments should tackle this job of weeding. When ought the job to be done? . . . Who should do the weeding? What outside assistance is desirable? (P.R.O. or other experts). What can be done at an early stage in the life of important papers to ensure they will survive? 64 At an informal preparatory meeting held two months later, and ominously titled 'The Alarming Accumulation of Modern Departmental Records', Sir Hilary assented to the idea that there was a crisis but then recited his earlier argument that there were: Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer to arrange for the appointment of a Committee to make an urgent review of the arrangements for preserving valuable official records and for destroying those which were of no permanent value or interest.' 61 R.A. Butler, the chancellor of the exchequer, informed the prime minister on 18 Apr. 1952 that 'You have mentioned to me more than once the amount of building and shelf space taken up by departmental records of which many could easily be destroyed. The last time the question came up was at Cabinet on the 5 th February when I was invited to arrange for the appointment of a committee to make an urgent review of the arrangements for preserving valuable official records and for destroying those which were of no permanent value or interest . . . ' 67 and then to his future colleagues: 68 the increase in the volume of departmental papers, prompted by the growth of government business and aided by the typewriter and duplicating machine, was accelerating so fast that it was on the verge of becoming unmanageable. 69 It was a pressing crisis that demanded a pressing solution, and the committee's formal terms of reference would be to 'review the arrangements for the preservation of the records of Government departments . . . in the light of the rate at which they are accumulating and of the purposes which they are intended to serve'. 70 The master of the rolls, Lord Evershed, would later recall in a memorandum to the lord chancellor:
There are in the Public Record Office about 40 miles of Records covering the whole period of English history. The quantity of documents now in Government Departments awaiting sorting and transfer and representing about 50 years only of administration is said to amount to about 1½ times the whole content of the Public Record Office. . . . The problem of Departmental Records having assumed such proportions that it was in danger of reaching administrative breakdown, the "Grigg Committee" . . . was appointed by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself '. 71 An editorial in The Times commented that 'No country in the world compares with England for the copiousness and continuity of its public records. No age in history compares with the present for the abundance with which Governments 65 TNA, T 222/538, The alarming accumulation of modern departmental records: Notes of an informal discussion at the Public Record Office, 17 Jan. 1952. 66 Ibid. 67 In a draft letter inviting him to chair the committee, it was suggested that Sir Edward Bridges should put it that 'One of our growing problem is the accumulation of departmental records. Each year more paper is put on files of Government departments. Much of it has to be preserved in any case and even where destruction is permissible it is apt not to keep up with creation. The result is not only a problem of housing but also of availability. . . .' TNA, T 222/538, Draft of 7 Apr. 1952. 68 Edward Playfair of the Treasury wrote to one prospective member, Professor Robertson of Cambridge, who proved unable to serve, 'We have been getting more and more appalled by the problem of departmental records; they pile up and up -you have watched them accumulating with your own eyes. . . .', TNA, T 222/538, 3 May 1952. Another, undated draft letter in the same file, despatched to those who had accepted the invitation, reiterated the same point: 'I am sure I need not stress to you how fearsome a problem we are faced with these days in sorting and storing the papers produced in the course of conducting the business of the many Government departments. . . . The problem is most urgent'. The letter that was eventually sent on 28 May 1952 opened less dramatically: 'There is growing uneasiness about the problem presented by the accumulation of the records of Government departments. . . .' 69 And that sense of a crisis of capacity has pervaded reports about the state of other national archives. What does not seem to have been envisaged as a viable solution at the time was any compensatory increase in the PRO's permanent storage capacity. The Treasury had always been grudging when asked to approve such expenditure, 73 and that was not the direction which thinking was encouraged to take. In 1954, after the committee had done its work, D.B. Wardle, assistant keeper, first class, responsible for repository and photography matters at the PRO, wrote to David Evans, the new deputy keeper, that 'the statement of the [Grigg] Report to the effect that it is the inescapable duty of the Government of a civilised state to make adequate arrangements for the preservation of its Records might I feel have been followed (at the appropriate point) by mention of the fact that there has been no building of permanent accommodation specifically designed for the purpose of housing the Public Records during this century, and that for fifty years and more a series of temporary expedients has been adopted to deal with the overf low from Chancery Lane'. 74 But his was virtually a lone protest.
Perhaps there never could be quite enough space for everything that might and should have been retained, but the much-trumpeted crisis of overf low did frame the genesis and work of the new committee and it was held to follow, in the words of The Times editorial, that 'The problem of preservation, if it means preservation for use, becomes in practice the problem of how, what, and when to destroy'. It was to be that formulation of the problem which provided the Leitmotiv of much of what followed, and it allowed record management all too easily to become record scrapping. Hans Rasmussen described 'the spirit of this movement as one of rather pragmatic managerialism in which destruction became an ironic sign of progress in a period grappling with an explosion of records'. 75 The Grigg committee received submissions from government departments 76 and inspected 'representative registries', 77 examining their procedures for 'reviewing papers for destruction or preservation', 78 and it is not remarkable that it came to conclude that there was a manifest and urgent need to reduce the volume of records that could and should be saved. 'Few of these', it declared, 'will need to be preserved, but their very number greatly complicates the process of deciding which should be preserved, and which destroyed'. 79 The committee's deliberations were described by Kenneth Clucas, its secretary, as having been governed throughout by a 'general feeling . . . that the PRO 72 76 Including a memorandum from Margaret Gowing, then at the Cabinet Office. She also submitted a note under her own name, at the Sir James' invitation, with the title of 'A war historian's experience of a departmental registry'. Amongst other matters, she reported that 'Many important papers were never registered. . . . Very frequently there is no record of meetings of officials when important policies were decided. . . . We had numerous examples of important files that had been lost. . . ' TNA, T 222/989. 77 85 and its reasoning appeared -on the surface at least -to have been largely impervious to the accepted procedures and thinking of Government archivists. 86 There was in particular to be a very deliberate rupture not only with past practice in Whitehall and the PRO but also with its champion, the deputy keeper of the records. Although he was quite adamant that he should be a member of the new committee, 87 precautions were taken to exclude Sir Hilary, 'the doyen of the archival profession in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth', 88 a man described as a 'giant', 89 the writer of the 'first book of its kind based on English experience' 90 of archive administration, from any of its proceedings.
Sir Hilary was a man publicly honoured, a leader in his field nationally and internationally, 91 and a scholar who had written prolifically about such diverse matters as court handwriting in early and later medieval England; parish records; Jewish history and archives; the study of English common law records; the records of the English african companies; the plea rolls of the exchequer; the financial records of the reign of King John; seals in the PRO, and much else. He was, and remains, an inf luential figure, 'the most eminent archivist of his generation in the English-speaking world ', 92 who stressed the hazards and uncertainties of weeding the archives, of attempting to 80 81 John Cantwell refers to the work of the committee being for a while jeopardised by an unspecified crisis. He recorded that 'At one point [Sir James] was threatening resignation -Sir K could not recall the exact incident -but after a lapse of some weeks in Cttee business, Sir K (evidently a model of tact) persuaded him to take up the task once more'. He then added: 'Actually, it had to do with the feeling of the historians that either the Treasury or the PRO should have some power of enforcement, which Sir J. G. considered unconstitutional'. Ibid. 82 His entry in the ODNB reports how Herbert Morrison recalled that 'Grigg had a considerable f lair for frank speech, aggravated by a hot temper. I recall a day at No. 10 when we were all waiting to enter the Cabinet Room. I was chatting to Sir James and we began mildly to disagree. In a matter of a moment or two he was denouncing me and being extremely rude. I mildly enquired who was having a row with whom. Sir John Anderson, another civil servant turned minister, who was present on this occasion, said "It's all right, Herbert. 95 but once identified as records they had to be treated as inviolate. 96 His was an emphatically self-denying ordinance which prevented the archivist from playing the activist role in record management which the Treasury sought (Terry Cook aptly called it a 'curatorial, neutered, and self-deprecating professional mind-set' 97 ). In that critical year of 1951, under threat from the Treasury and its new mode of management, he repeated that:
The Public Records are not an artificial Collection, the size and scope of which can be precisely limited or predicted, but a Natural Accumulation which grows, and must continue to grow, with the continuance and growth of Public Administration: to solve satisfactorily the problem of their Housing is not therefore a question merely of calculating their bulk at a given moment and obtaining an amount of building and shelves sufficient to accommodate it, but of securing a space adequate for expansion over a very long term of years . . .
98
His critics were not to be quelled. It was, said Hans Rasmussen, their consensual judgement that the PRO under Sir Hilary's management was inept and 'famously antiquarian'. 99 Sir Hilary was known to be ill-disposed to the kind of radical restructuring which the Treasury might propose, 100 and his own principles of record management were generally dismissed as passé, but it was not solely for those reasons he was shunned. It was an ad hominem matter. Officials disliked the man and his amour 93 He said (1937) that documents become archives when 'having ceased to be in current use, they are definitely set aside for preservation, tacitly adjudged worthy of being kept. The difficulty is that it is impossible to predict with any certainty what future historians will consider worthy of being kept. We are left', he continued, 'with a growing conviction that destruction of any . . . Archives we have received from the past is a course that a conscientious Archivist must find it difficult to comment. . . . It has emerged with tolerable clearness . . . that the Archivist is not and should not be primarily concerned with the modern interests which his Archives at any given time may serve. He is concerned to keep their qualities intact for the use, perhaps, in the future, of students working upon subjects which neither he nor any one else has contemplated. . . . we find the conclusion unavoidable that destruction is an operation which can only be practised with undoubted safety in one case -that of word-for-word duplicates: all other proposed criteria are fallacious; and in any case there is great difficulty in finding suitable persons to carry them out'. Hilary Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration (1937), pp. 8, 145-6, 147. Two years later he returned to that theme. He was, he said, unable to condone 'the destruction of Records or . . . [suggest] that any qualities of scholarship or experience will make it possible to "choose" with certainty out of a mass of records those which future historians will find most useful ' propre. He was considered to be too self-confident, too much of a grandee, too lordly, 101 too much the 'absolutist . . . who defended his archival principles with the passion of a preacher defending moral principles'. 102 Sir Edward Bridges, in charge of setting up the committee, said of one preparatory meeting in early January 1952 that he was, 'obviously going to be extremely difficult to deal with. He was touchy and acid to a degree. He was resentful of the O. & M. investigation. He says that he is the world authority on the subject and that everything will be simple if only his methods are adopted at once'.
103 Sir Edward's conclusion, voiced 18 days later, was that he felt it would be most unfortunate if Sir Hilary Jenkinson were to be made a member of the Committee. . . . His talent seems to me to be quite extraordinarily narrow and his vanity great. As soon as he steps outside his own particular speciality, which is the conservation of archives, in the narrowest sense of the word, he is apt to make the most careless and obvious mistakes from unwillingness to question his own beliefs. . . . He would try to run [the committee] himself and would infuriate all the members . . .
104
His colleague, Edward Playfair, third secretary at the Treasury, the man with responsibility for the division that dealt with the arts and science, concurred. Sir Hilary, he said, was an 'old mountain of prejudice', 'a real cough-drop. . . . he talks incessantly and is perfectly convinced that he knows all the answers'. The committee would have 'the most awful time' 105 if Sir Hilary were allowed to join it. And if the chief archivist had to be excluded so, by extension, it was concluded, it would be impossible not to banish his lesser colleagues in the PRO. Sir Edward added that he was 'quite determined to try to get an enquiry . . . which should be composed entirely of external persons -no serving civil servants of any kind'. I feel, for reasons which I can explain in greater detail when we meet, that the usefulness of the committee will be greatly increased if no serving civil servant is a member of it. I know that this gives you great difficulty because of the Deputy Keeper's unique experience, which you feel should be directly at the service of the committee throughout its deliberations. Perhaps we could have a word about this.
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There had then followed the conversation about 'whether Jenkinson should be on the committee. On this the master of the rolls was very helpful. He suggested at one time that Evans, the Principal Assistant Keeper should be a member of the committee but agreed in the end that the simplest line was to take the view that no official should be on the committee at all'. 109 It was not only the master of the rolls who was very helpful. The chancellor of the exchequer had also secured the prime minister's blessing for the deputy keeper's blackballing in April 1952, having told him that 'this is a question on which fresh minds are needed and we shall do much better if we do not have on the committee representatives either of the creators or the hoarders of files'. 110 It was an irresistible show of force.
It thus looks as if much of the personal inf luence which domestic government archivists -the hoarders of files -might have been able to wield had been driven off-stage. The officials of the PRO were allowed to observe the occasional meeting; submit 'a considerable body of preliminary information'; 111 and, chief ly through John Collingridge, keep in touch with the committee's secretary, Kenneth Clucas.
112 They could comment on drafts. But they had no direct hand in writing the report, and Sir Hilary was not even shown an advance copy of the final version or told when it would be published. 113 The secretary, for his part, had preferred to keep his distance from a man who was himself said not 'to like anyone to come too near'. 114 He later reported that:
So it was that officials of the PRO tended to be held at arm's length. They returned only afterwards, when Sir Hilary had left his post in April 1954, to a re-born institution under a new deputy keeper where they prepared guidance for a new breed of departmental record officers. In what The Times headlined a 'plan for relief of Record Office', 116 the report (in Sir James Grigg's words) 'roasted' Sir Hilary and his 'antiquated, unworkable scheduling system' 117 that was based on retaining the structure of the PRO intact and a notion of the archive as a repository, a natural growth which was 'as much an organism as a tree or animal', 118 that should be fiercely protected for as yet undetermined future use. 119 It proposed in its stead the introduction of a revolutionary, rationalised, comprehensive, formally-structured and busily interventionist model of retention and destruction.
Sir Hilary's published riposte was a partial, grudging acceptance of the report -the growth in the mass of modern records had got out of hand 120 and it did need reining in -but he also issued a warning that that a shift to managerialism would only imperil the professional standards of the archivist. 'There will be a tendency', he protested, 'to employ for the administration of Modern Archives, if that is made a separate affair, persons of a lower educational grade, or, at least, persons not qualified by special training to act as Archivists'.
121 But most disagreed. They believed that the committee had had no choice in the matter.
Kenneth Clucas told Sir James that he 'had successfully dusted the kingdom's archives'. 122 The keeper of the records and master of the rolls remarked to Sir James that his recommendations were 'absolutely right. At any rate, I have heard of no sensible alternative to what you have proposed'.
123 Margaret Gowing, Sir William Hancock's collaborator as official historian, a woman who could be most critical of the state of the records, one of the committee's members, said that 'there is now at least a good chance, where none existed before, of preventing chaos in the legacy of government records that the twentieth century will bequeath to its luckless descendants'.
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There was little mourning for the prospective loss of historical records. That had never been the focal concern. Even in the profession's own mouthpiece, the Journal of the Society of Archivists, an eager commentator pronounced that 'The report rightly assumes that a large proportion of the documents created in a department should be destroyed as of no value to anybody. Those that are kept must be worthy of the endless trouble and expense that their retention will entail -valuable accommodation, equipment, cleaning, preservation and repairs through the centuries. Selection must be drastic . . .' 125 And that adjective -'drastic' -began to creep into the vocabulary of record management at the time, 126 part, as it were, of a new language of crisis management and purging. Culling was to be all. A note for the record, lodged in a Treasury file about impending legislation, announced that 'the new principles of reviewing' required 'destroying everything that is not wanted instead of destroying only what is specified on a Schedule'. But it then added the seemingly nervous caution 'Best not include in the Bill, but cover in Rules, to be made by the Lord Chancellor under the Act'. 127 Individual government departments would now assume responsibility for administering that drastic new selection process under the general supervision of a new public records department; 128 the management of the new department (against the wishes of the master of the rolls 129 and senior officials of the Public Record Office 130 ) would be transferred to a minister of the Crown; and inspectors would be appointed to ensure that the new arrangements were being conducted properly (there were to be four such inspectors at first and they were in position by September 1956).
Government ministries were in their turn to appoint a suitable internal official, a departmental records officer, 131 to take charge of their papers, and in a manner not unlike the three-stage life cycle for records, review them five years after they had 'passed out of active use' (para. 80) and then destroy those which were no longer needed 132 (and the first such officers were nominated in May 1956 -there were to be officers in post in 64 departments by the end of the next year). Any records not thus discarded were to be reviewed again after 25 years, and those considered no longer to be of historical or administrative importance were to be destroyed (para. 87). Records that did succeed in passing that second muster were to be kept only if they were deemed still to be of administrative use, and the remainder were to be sent for safekeeping to the Public Record Office (although the criteria for identifying historical importance were not clearly identified at the time). That was not to be the end of the matter. Attrition could continue. The archivists of the Public Record Office were obliged to keep their own stock of documents under 'continuous review' and, in consultation with the relevant departments, dispose of those which were thought no longer to justify retention. (Under the Public Record Act, this would require the consent of the lord chancellor and the procedure is very rarely adopted.)
The proposals received a guarded endorsement from the PRO in September 1954.
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A memorandum to Sir Alexander Johnston, a third secretary at the Treasury who was in charge of controlling departmental expenditure, from David Evans, Sir Hilary's successor as the new deputy keeper of the records and later, very brief ly, the first occupant of the new post of keeper of the records, said, a little optimistically perhaps, that he took it that the report 'boils down to recommending strongly that our present organisation under Collingridge [the PRO's liaison officer] be augmented in status, numbers and authority to deal with the immediate problems and to introduce in due course the new procedure.' But he and his colleagues were also disturbed about the prospect of administrative upheaval, and he added, in one of the very rare references to the matter, that:
Historians . . . will examine carefully the proposals that the responsibility for deciding what records are to be retained at the First Review should rest with the Departments themselves . . . They may wish to be assured that the very large quantity of papers (50 to 90 per cent is the estimate) that will be destroyed within a few years of compilation do not contain classes of document that may be of considerable interest to posterity though not to present administration. They may be disturbed by the fact that the introduction of these new and drastic proposals will coincide with the transfer of responsibility from the century-old charge of the Master of the Rolls to a more remote Departmental Minister. 134 His observation was ignored. An undated 'Paper for Home Affairs Committee Paper', prepared for the lord chancellor by the financial secretary to the Treasury, acknowledged in the new, commonplace terminology that the proposal for a system of first and second review:
is a drastic one. It may well involve destroying some records that future historians would like to see. But there were three historians and a University librarian 135 on the Committee, and other historians (who were consulted informally) were satisfied. There has been, as far as I am aware, no serious criticism of the Report after publication. In brief, the Committee's view is that a substantial amount of destruction is inevitable in any case; and that the amount of significant material that might be lost in this way is likely to be less than under any other system which it would be practicable to adopt. . . . I ask my colleagues to agree that the general principle of Reviews after about 5 years and about 25 years respectively, and of destruction on the criteria recommended, should be accepted. . . .
And, as an ironic, crowning argument, Sir Hilary himself could be summoned in support of the contention that it was quite impossible to gauge the potential historical importance of records. A review of his magnum opus, the Manual of Archive Administration, conducted by Kenneth Clucas for Sir James Grigg, applauded his stance that archivists and historians were not at all well placed to determine the future interest of present documents -the only credible judge was the administrator. 137 The secretary wrote to Sir James on the 23 September 1952 that he had spoken to J.R. Simpson, the director of organisation and methods at the Treasury, about the idea that there should be a: joint inspecting staff of O and M plus P.R.O., with a Committee of historians in the background, to deal with questions of historical importance . . . The more I consider Jenkinson's arguments in his book the more interesting I find it. It is, indeed, remarkable that anyone should be able, at one and the same time, to hold these views and yet find nothing wrong with the present system whereby destruction schedules are approved by archivists in collaboration with, in difficult cases, with historians. I like, both in principle and in practice, his thesis that neither the archivist nor the historian should play any part in the selection of documents for retention . . . I think he is right in wanting to have a system where it is the administrator who decides what to keep. To make the historian the final arbiter is not at all satisfactory. It is impossible for any man to forecast what the historian of anything but the immediate future will require . . . . Let the archives of the future be records of the conduct of work in Government Departments as it is actually carried out, and let the administrators decide what is to be kept. 138 The director's reply to the secretary had been enthusiastic:
To my intense surprise I found very little in your summary of Sir Hilary's Manual with which to quarrel . . . I think there is a distinct possibility that we could go quite a long way with Sir Hilary and I particularly like his argument that it is impossible to look at public records from the point of view of what will interest historians of the future . . .' 139 Sir Hilary's own comment was a little opaque but he did not seem to dissent from the way in which he had been represented by the Secretary: 'What I said was . . . a scrutiny from the point of view solely of historic interest "might possibly intrude" but that this was "to be employed only with due precaution" and that in most cases it would probably be best to omit it'. 140 'The Archivist', it had been agreed, 'is not and ought not to be an Historian'. 141 It was not to be the projected interests of posterity or future historians that drove the committee. It was not to be historians who would be awarded a formal role in record management. The Grigg report went to Cabinet on 3 March 1955 where the sole problem discussed was 'the expediency of opening Cabinet records to public inspection after 50 years'. 142 That was a sticking point, a matter of key interest to ministers whose deliberations would no longer be confidential, and it was agreed, in the prime minister's words, that it should be 'subject to further study and thought'. The question of access was duly referred three weeks later to a meeting of senior officials which endorsed the recommendation that records should be open to public inspection only after fifty years, subject to the caveat 'that Government Departments should retain discretion to withhold particular classes of documents of their own choice from such inspection'. 143 The report then returned to Cabinet on 7 June 1955, where it was presented by its secretary, Sir Norman Brook, as 'a rational and comprehensive scheme for reducing to order the chaotic arrangements for pruning Departmental records and ensuring that those of importance are accessible to historians of the future in the public record office'. 144 It was there concluded that the chancellor of the exchequer should give effect to as many of the report's proposals as possible, whilst giving yet more time to a consideration of the problem of the 50-year rule. 145 The government promptly announced its acceptance of the main proposals, 146 although the timing of the right of public inspection was a predicament that was to detain officials for several months more.
John Collingridge was appointed as the very first records administration officer in December 1955 (it had been the grading of his new, and, some thought, anomalous position that had also delayed progress); 147 and a number of the committee's other recommendations had already been implemented by the time a Bill was presented, after protracted internal discussion about details of structure, remuneration and staffing, 148 to an ill-attended Parliament in December 1957. 149 But there were some few matters that did demand legislation, 150 and it was to the threat of a looming torrent of paper which the lord chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, the man who was about to take charge of the problem, again referred in opening the debate: so it is estimated, a further 120 miles which are still retained by Government Departments, but which may ultimately be transferred to the Public Record Office for permanent preservation. This will present a considerable accommodation problem in the future. I learnt with surprise that the quantity of paper destroyed by Government Departments last year amounted to no less than 3,600 tons.
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It was a threat that was alluded to once more in March 1958 when the solicitorgeneral, Sir Harry Hylton-Foster, the Shiva of the records, moved the second reading of the Bill in the House of Commons. His talk was all about the necessity, indeed the joy, of destruction:
I shudder to think of what it must have looked like to those working in the [Public Record] Office -a dreadful f lood of documents descending upon those scholarly and not underburdened civil servants who give such admirable public service. . . . It is plain, I submit, that there was dire need for the Bill . . . The new system is already under way, and the House will be interested to know how it is working. Of course, if it is to work well, it is essential that Departments must go through their records and destroy what is not worth keeping. In accordance with the recommendation of the Grigg Committee, in paragraph 131 of its Report, a Records Administration Officer has been appointed in the Public Record Office. There is some evidence that he and his inspecting officers are already playing a useful part. I take an almost sadistic satisfaction in thinking of these figures. It was estimated that the amount, or dead weight -if that be the happy description -of documents destroyed by the Departments in 1956 was 3,600 tons. Since the beneficial inf luence of the new system, the year 1957 produced an estimated quantity destroyed of 5,398 tons in the year -about 60 miles of shelving, for those who like to be statistically minded . . . 152 The one section of the Bill that excited parliamentary attention, 153 just as it had earlier excited ministers and officials, was the proposal that records should be open to public inspection only after fifty years. That was considered by some Members of Parliament -the men and women who were supposed to scrutinise ministerial and official actionsto be too long, and it was put right ten years later. 154 But the proposal that a substantial amount of destruction was both inevitable and desirable, and the criteria and methods that would have to be devised to achieve it, were neither defended nor explained 155 what principles are to be applied to selection'). 157 There was in their place the simple overriding presumption that, in the phrase of Lord Evershed, 'there was a tremendous proliferation of paper in the modern State', 158 that almost all of it had to be jettisoned to avert a calamity, and the Bill's focus should be on the proper safekeeping of the relatively few records of administrative interest that would be allowed to remain. What followed was drastically to mould the policies of the PRO and affect the possibilities of almost everything that we, as historians of the late twentieth century were able to do.
